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After earning her position in the very highest echelon of legal scholarship by 
reinterpreting property law, Margaret Jane Radin has, over the last decade, guided us 
into the new terrains of intellectual property and cyberlaw.  In “A Comment on 
Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu,” Radin continues the course, 
offering an important heuristic to think about the relationship of intellectual property 
to “neighboring” legal subdisciplines.     
Radin warns us that our intellectual property laws are being rewritten in ways 
that neglect values embedded in neighboring legal subdisciplines, such as contract, 
competition, and free speech law.1  The effect has been to aggrandize the rights of 
intellectual property holders, at the expense of others in society.  In my comment on 
Radin’s elegant paper, I will apply her insight to an oft-neglected realm: our spirited 
efforts to export our ever-strengthening intellectual property law through bilateral 
trade agreements.  Radin critiques the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anti-
circumvention provisions, which some companies have cleverly sought to deploy to 
bar competition in the after-market.2  As I will show, the controversial provisions at 
the heart of those efforts are being exported to foreign states by our free trade 
                                                                
*Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.  J.D. Yale Law Schoool; A.B. Harvard 
College. For research assistance, I thank Kathryn Lee and librarians Elisabeth McKechnie and 
Erin Murphy.  I thank Jamie Love for an illuminating conversation on the subject. 
1Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006).  In a new paper, Madhavi Sunder observes that a plethora of 
values exist within intellectual property law, as well.  Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006) (on file with author); see also William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (arguing that copyright law serves 
fundamentally to underwrite a democratic culture). 
2Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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agreements.  My underlying concern is that we may be exporting our all-too-narrow 
vision of intellectual property to many of our trading partners.3 
Hard upon the Millennial turn, the United States embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to enter into bilateral and regional free trade agreements.4  After a period 
of relative quiet following free trade agreements with Israel (1985), Canada (1989), 
and Mexico (1994), we saw entry into force of free trade agreements in rapid 
succession: Jordan (December 2001), Chile (January 2004), Singapore (January 
2004), Australia (January 2005), Morocco (January 2006), and Bahrain (January 
2006).5  The Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) will go into full effect upon ratification by Costa Rica, and 
went into effect between the United States and El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua earlier this year.6  The United States is actively pursuing free trade 
agreements with Panama; the United Arab Emirates; the Andean countries of 
Colombia, Peru (signed but not ratified as of this writing), and Ecuador; the southern 
African countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa; 
Oman (signed, but not ratified); and Thailand.7  All of the free trade agreements 
negotiated post-DMCA mandate the adoption of anti-circumvention provisions by 
our free trade partners. 
This effort to export the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions should cause us 
concern.  Efforts in the United States to apply the anti-circumvention provisions of 
the DMCA to protecting the after-markets for garage door openers8 and printer 
cartridges9 are rightly notorious.  In such cases, a company with a popular product 
seeks to attract monopoly rents in follow-on goods by including software in its 
original product that makes unauthorized follow-on goods incompatible.  As Radin 
                                                                
3Cf. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 1, 23 
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (expressing concern that we may be 
“[e]xporting a dysfunctional system to the rest of the world”).   
4This reflects a global trend.  The WTO reports that the number of regional trade 
agreements (“RTAs”) notified over the last decade was greater than the number notified over 
the five preceding decades: “In the period 1948-1994, the GATT received 124 notifications of 
[Regional Trade Agreements] (relating to trade in goods), and since the creation of the WTO 
in 1995, over 130 additional arrangements covering trade in goods or services have been 
notified.”  World Trade Organization, Facts and Figures, at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (last visited April 10, 2006). 
5UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2005 
ANNUAL REPORT 114-25 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Trade_Policy_Agenda/Section_Index.html. 
6United States Government, EXPORT.GOV, at http://www.export.gov/fta/complete/ 
CAFTA/ (undated). 
7Id.  I also discuss the draft agreement creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
below, though negotiations on that treaty have stalled.  See infra notes 49-50 and 
accompanying text.   
8Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d 1178. 
9Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d 572. 
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warns, such cases demonstrate that the DMCA might not have adequately accounted 
for the concerns of the neighboring legal subdiscipline of competition.  As I will 
show, foreign states will likely face similar struggles, difficulties which they might 
have avoided if policymakers had followed Radin’s instruction to heed the “legal 
milieu” of intellectual property.  The problem becomes especially alarming because 
our poorer trading partners can ill afford the monopoly rents that anti-circumvention 
law might support.  Furthermore, many of our trading partners in the developing 
world lack competition laws altogether or the resources to enforce them where they 
exist.  There is a special irony that free trade might lead to a legal framework that 
facilitates monopolies in the after-market. 
Equally troubling is the possibility that this legal export will carry with it what 
Radin has earlier described as “Efficacious Promulgated Superseding Entitlement 
Regimes” or “EPSERs.”10  As Radin points out, EPSERs often arise through private 
contracts that modify default public law.  But they may also arise through 
technological self-help, such as “Technological Protection Measures” (or “Digital 
Rights Management”), which control uses of digital work through technology.  As 
Radin writes, “DRMS’s–if wide deployment of them does come to pass–will attempt 
to accomplish by machine fiat what was previously attempted by contract.”11     
Overly constricting FTAs also pose a danger for the United States.  FTA 
obligations, it must be remembered, generally apply equally to the United States. 
Thus, it is possible that the United States could run afoul of its own FTAs.  The 
FTAs are not term-limited, though they do permit withdrawal.  Should we conclude 
in the future that the DMCA anti-circumvention rules are too constricting, we will 
have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the FTA, or conform to an uncongenial rule.  Our 
FTA partners may often lack the internal economic incentive to seek to enforce the 
FTA’s strict anti-circumvention terms (though they may take it as a license to reduce 
their own anti-circumvention excess), yet they may seek to enforce the FTA once 
partnered with interested multinational corporations engaged in rent-seeking. 
My goal here is limited.  I do not attack the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA as wholly misguided; the desire to prevent widespread piracy of copyrighted 
works is understandable.  At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that the critique 
I offer here is the sum of the adverse consequences of that statute, including for 
speech and education.12  My argument is limited to the threat posed by the export of 
the DMCA anti-circumvention rules, which do not explicitly guard against the anti-
competitive use of those rules.   
Part I briefly sketches the difficulties created domestically by a DMCA 
inattentive to concerns over competition.  Part II describes how these legal problems 
are being exported to our trading partners through free trade agreements.  
                                                                
10Margaret Jane Radin, Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of 
the State with the “Law” of the Firm, 1 U. OTTAWA LEGAL TECH. J. 173, 178 (2003-2004); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 5 (2004). 
11 See Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, supra note 10, at 11. 
12On copyright law’s role in promoting democratic culture around the world, see Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 217  (1998). 
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I. THE PROBLEM OF DMCA LOCKOUTS 
Garage door openers and printer cartridges were certainly far from the minds of 
lawmakers when they passed the DMCA in 1998.  Yet, in an environment in which 
silicon chips are embedded in more and more of our most ordinary products, 
potentially copyrightable material can be found in the most unexpected places.13  
This makes it possible to invoke the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions in a 
wide variety of areas—including printer cartridges, garage door openers, and video 
game multiplayer interfaces—as the next section describes. 
A.  Deploying Anti-Circumvention to Bar After-Market Competition 
Printer maker Lexmark designed its printers to accept only Lexmark-authorized 
toner cartridges.  Static Control Components (SCC) manufactured a microchip that 
could enable non-Lexmark authorized toner cartridges to function in Lexmark 
printers.  Lexmark brought suit, asserting, among other things, that SCC violated the 
DMCA by circumventing an access control protecting copyrighted software on the 
printer.  Though Lexmark prevailed at trial, the Sixth Circuit rejected the claim, 
holding that Lexmark’s copyrighted software on its printer was not in fact protected 
by an effective access control, since that software could be read directly from the 
printer memory itself.14 
Also seeking to ward off competition, Chamberlain sued Skylink for marketing a 
universal garage door opener that could operate Chamberlain garage doors.15  
Chamberlain argued Skylink’s garage door opener acted as a circumvention device, 
breaking through the electronic barriers in Chamberlain’s system to reach its 
copyrighted software.  The Federal Circuit ruled that because the homeowners who 
had purchased Chamberlain’s garage door systems were authorized to access those 
systems, there could be no DMCA hacking violation.16   
In both Lexmark and Chamberlain, the courts rebuffed efforts by companies to 
exploit DMCA anti-circumvention rules to bar competition.  So should we not relax 
our concern about the DMCA’s overreach?  No, in both cases, a clever company can 
make some simple changes that might bring it within the protections of DMCA anti-
circumvention.  Lexmark, for example, can try to protect the software on its printer 
from being read by the attached computer, thus creating an effective access control, 
and thereby potentially qualifying for the DMCA prohibition.  For its part, 
Chamberlain might notify its users that no third party garage door opener may access 
its garage door receiver, thereby potentially creating a DMCA circumvention when 
its copyrighted software is accessed by an unauthorized garage door opener.  It is 
possible, of course, that the market would discipline such tying behavior (and 
therefore make it unwise for a profit-maximizing firm), but either imperfect 
competition or imperfect information might make this less likely.   
                                                                
13See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 512 (2005) 
(noting that “in the new millennium, . . . the distinction between physical goods and 
information products becomes increasingly blurred”). 
14Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d 522. 
15Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d 1178. 
16Id. at 1203. 
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Indeed, in his concurrence in Lexmark, Judge Merritt astutely foresaw the next 
move that companies like Lexmark might make, and he discouraged them from such 
clever manipulations.  Judge Merritt worried that companies could “use the DMCA 
in conjunction with copyright law to create monopolies of manufactured goods for 
themselves just by tweaking the facts of this case . . . .”17 Judge Merritt noted the 
possibility of abuse that certain interpretations of the DMCA might open: “A 
monopolist could enforce its will against a smaller rival simply because the potential 
cost of extended litigation and discovery where the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant is itself a deterrent to innovation and competition.”18  Judge Merritt 
accordingly sought to limit the DMCA to cases that involved the “pirating of 
copyright-protected works such as movies, music, and computer programs.”19  
However, the panel’s opinion itself does not restrict the DMCA anti-circumvention 
provisions in this way.   
In Chamberlain, too, the Federal Circuit explicitly recognized the competition 
issues at stake.  It observed that accepting Chamberlain’s “interpretation of the 
DMCA would . . . grant manufacturers broad exemptions from both the antitrust 
laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse.”20  But resolving the issue so as to avoid 
the anticompetitive effects proved complicated, as the length and intricacy of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision indicate.   
Indeed, the dividing line between permissible and impermissible circumvention 
is difficult to draw.  Consider Davidson v. Jung, in which Blizzard Entertainment, 
which permits players of its computer games to play against each other online using 
its own proprietary “Battle.net” system, brought suit against an open source 
alternative to its proprietary system.21  A group of volunteers developed an 
alternative system known as bnetd, permitting users of Blizzard’s games to play 
against each other even outside the Battle.net system.  Blizzard sued the bnetd 
volunteers, alleging, among other things, violations of the DMCA anti-
circumvention rules because its software permitted users to access protected portions 
of their games that permitted online gaming.  Bnetd might have seemed an ideal 
candidate to claim the exception available for reverse engineering to achieve 
interoperability.22  The system enabled individual game users to interoperate their 
games, indeed in a massive multi-player setting.  Yet, the Eighth Circuit rejected the 
interoperability claim out of hand.  Bnetd’s central error was that it did not ensure 
that two users were not simultaneously using the same CD key, and therefore 
                                                                
17Lexmark Int’l, 387 F. 3d 551 (Merritt, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
18Id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring). 
19Id. 
20Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1193. 
21Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).  See generally Dan L. Burk, 
Legal And Technical Standards In Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 537, 564-65 (2005). 
22The DMCA permits reverse engineering “for the sole purpose” of trying to achieve 
“interoperability” of computer programs through reverse engineering.  See 17 U.S.C § 1201(f) 
(2006). Subsection (f)(4) defines interoperability as “the ability of computer programs to 
exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the information which has been 
exchanged.”  Id. 
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permitted illicit copies.  Davidson demonstrates how precarious the interpretation of 
the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions can be. 
B.  The DMCA’s Cramped Vision 
The contortions required by the courts in the above cases might have been 
avoided if Congress had adopted Radin’s suggestion to consider the broader legal 
milieu in which copyright rests.   
A number of countries are taking steps to craft legal room for circumvention 
beyond that explicitly sanctioned in the DMCA—considering a variety of societal 
concerns beyond the desire to maximize the production of information.  The 
European Union’s Copyright Directive enumerates exemptions from anti-
circumvention that go beyond those tolerated under the DMCA, including an 
exception for teaching and scientific research, and for non-commercial use by 
disabled persons.  Under Norwegian law, if a technological measure “hinders . . . 
‘enjoyment within the private sphere’ of a lawfully acquired copy of a work, the user 
may circumvent the measure in order to ‘enjoy’ the work on . . . ‘relevant playback 
equipment.’”23  At the time of this writing, the French government seems to have 
retreated from a proposal to require Apple to share its encryption technology on 
songs purchased in iTunes to ensure interoperability with non-Apple music players.24  
Apple had denounced an early draft of the law as “state-sponsored piracy.”25 
After an extensive (two-hundred page) review of the anti-circumvention 
provisions in the U.S.-Australia FTA, an Australian parliamentary committee 
proposed to make explicit a wide variety of exceptions not set out in the text.  The 
committee was responding to complaints from various constituents.  The Australian 
Tax Office, for example, worried that the exception for “law enforcement” must be 
“sufficiently wide so as to cover civil (including tax-related) as well as criminal law 
administration and enforcement.”26  Another example demonstrates the often 
unexpected consequences of a too-strict anti-circumvention regime: the Australian 
Office of Film and Literature Classification worried that the exceptions did not 
specifically provide for circumvention that may be necessary for classifying films 
and other works to determine the appropriate audience for the work.27  Responding to 
other suggestions, the Australian parliamentary committee recommended exceptions 
for “[m]aking back-up copies of computer programs; [t]he reproduction or 
                                                                
23Thomas Rieber-Mohn, Norway: Overview, EURO-COPYRIGHTS.ORG (last updated Mar. 
12, 2006), at http://www.euro-copyrights.org/index/17/65. 
24Greg Sandoval, France Backs Down on iTunes DRM Stance, CNET NEWS.COM (May 2, 
2006), at http://news.com.com/France+backs+down+on+iTunes+DRM+stance/2100-1027_3-
6067585.html. 
25Elinor Mills, Apple Calls French Law ‘State-Sponsored Piracy,’ CNET News.com 
(Mar. 22, 2006), at http://news.com.com/Apple+calls+French+law+state-sponsored+piracy/ 
2100 -1025_3-6052754.html. 
26Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Review of technological protection measures exceptions (Feb. 2006). 
27Id. at 55. 
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adaptation of computer programs for interoperability between computer programs; . . 
. and [i]nteroperability between computer programs and data.”28   
The Australian parliamentary committee interpreted the anti-circumvention 
provisions to allow the non-commercial creation of tools to utilize certain permitted 
exceptions.29  It also understood that the responsibility of creating such tools could 
not be limited to the permissible users of such tools alone.  It cited for support a 
submission from the Intellectual Property Committee of the Business Law Section of 
the Law Council of Australia, which observed: “‘Sound policy demands that a 
person’s freedom to take advantage of an exception from liability should not be 
determined by whether that person actually has (or can employ) the technical human 
capital to circumvent.’”30   
These examples demonstrate that states are beginning to recognize that a too-
strict anti-circumvention policy might harm a variety of societal interests.    
II. EXPORTING THE PROBLEM 
A.  Regime Shifting to Free Trade Agreements 
Free trade agreements are an oft-unnoticed forum for the export of American law.  
They rarely demand significant changes in United States law, but often require 
significant changes in the law of our trading partner.  Why should this be so?  As the 
world’s principal purchaser of internationally-traded goods and services,31 the United 
States is one of the most important trading partners for many, and perhaps most, of 
the world’s nations.  While the United States already has an economy that is the one 
of the world’s most open to goods from developing countries,32 trading partners still 
seek to secure that openness against retrenchment and expand it even further.  This 
eagerness to open the enormous United States market gives the United States 
significant leverage in its trade negotiations.  The imbalance of bilateral negotiations 
is one of the principal arguments for multilateral talks through the GATT and later 
the World Trade Organization fora.  Developing nations understand that, together, 
they represented a more formidable force—even against a united front of the United 
States, European Union, and Japan—than they would if they stood individually 
against any of the United States, European Union, or Japan.   
Why the recent move by the United States to intellectual property law through 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements?  As Larry Helfer points out, expanding 
intellectual property obligations imposed through the World Trade Organization does 
not seem politically feasible at the moment.  Developing countries have strongly 
                                                                
28Id. at 98. 
29Id. at 88. 
30Id. at 88 (internal citation omitted). 
31WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2005 at 21, 23 
(2005), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/ its05_overview_e.pdf (noting 
that United States imports represented 16.1% of all world trade merchandise imports, and 
12.4% of all world trade services imports).  
32United States Trade Representative, U.S. is World’s Most Open Economy to Developing 
Countries and Least Developed Countries, Dec. 2005, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_ 
Library/Fact_Sheets/2005/asset_upload_file264_8534.pdf. 
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resisted the expansion of obligations under TRIPs, and have sought instead to undo 
ones already in place.  Thus, the United States has “regime shifted” to more tractable 
fora.33   
Developing nations can ill afford the deadweight losses and shift from domestic 
consumer surplus to foreign producer surplus entailed in the rise of monopolies.  
Clever manipulations of the anti-circumvention rules may help companies establish 
monopolies in the aftermarket for goods and services related to their product.  In the 
developing world, once one gathers the significant resources to purchase a product 
produced in an advanced industrialized nation, one has to then consider how to 
maintain the product.  Local companies often step in to service the original product, 
often using non-brand name supplies because of the lower price.  This possibility 
may be significantly diminished with aggressive use of the anti-circumvention rules.   
Strict FTAs may also narrow the possibilities for reverse engineering, as they 
declare circumvention of technological protections for copyrighted works criminal.  
The exception for reverse engineering tolerated in the FTAs is limited to reverse 
engineering for interoperability.  Reverse engineering serves as an important vehicle 
for technology transfer, as engineers in the developing world disassemble the 
products of advanced industrial nations to learn about and service them.34   
B. Examining the Free Trade Agreements 
Each of the post-DMCA FTAs mandates anti-circumvention.  The first such 
FTA, with Jordan, however, does so at a high level of generality, leaving room for 
each side to create appropriate exceptions.  By the time that the United States came 
to negotiate the subsequent FTAs, such wiggle room was history.  Some of these 
FTAs are in effect already (Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and 
CAFTA with respect to El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua), while others are still 
either subject to ratification or implementation (Oman, Peru, and CAFTA with 
respect to Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala) or negotiation (the FTA 
with the Andean countries of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and potentially Bolivia).  
Even more ambitious yet is the agreement that would create a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, but negotiations towards this end are currently stalled.35  Each of these 
mandates lengthy anti-circumvention requirements, permitting exemptions to the 
anti-circumvention rule roughly as narrow as those in the DMCA.  In other words, 
there is no hint of concerns for the possible anti-competitive effects of the DMCA.  
The only exception is the draft of the, currently stalled, Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, which permits each country to specify its own exemptions. 
                                                                
33Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (Winter 2004); 
Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual 
Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 123 (Winter 2004) (describing regime shifting 
from traditional international intellectual property forum to alternative international fora). 
34While patent law may bar certain acts of reverse engineering, it can only do so with 
respect to inventions that are still in patent in the country in which the reverse engineering 
occurs. 
35Mei-Ling Hopgood & Jack Chang, Bush Is Bruised But Not Beaten in Talks, MIAMI 
HERALD, Nov. 6, 2005, at 1A (reporting stalling of negotiations due to opposition from Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay). 
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But are not the FTAs simply restating an obligation that our FTA partners had 
already undertaken before the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
through its Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty?36  
(TRIPs, it should be noted, does not mandate anti-circumvention.)  There are three 
reasons why the FTA anti-circumvention rules are meaningful in spite of the WIPO 
treaty obligations.  First, by moving this obligation into the sanctions-enforced 
bilateral and regional free trade regime, the anti-circumvention provisions finally get 
teeth.  Second, the WIPO treaties obligation with respect to anti-circumvention is 
quite minimal.  The mandate on anti-circumvention in the WIPO Copyright Treaty—
in full—is to “provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against 
the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized 
by the authors concerned or permitted by law.”37  This general statement leaves room 
for exceptions, including ones designed to protect competition.38  Finally, many of 
our trading partners had not ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty until seemingly 
prompted to do so by our FTA.39 
I now review the anti-circumvention provisions in each of the post-DMCA FTAs. 
I point out some salient differences, but there are others I do not note.  In general, the 
minimal variance across the bulk of the ten agreements demonstrates how little 
negotiation takes place in certain portions of these free trade agreements.   
Jordan.  The first FTA concluded by the United States after the enactment of the 
DMCA was with Jordan.40  That treaty included a short clause mandating that Jordan 
prohibit civilly and criminally the trafficking of any circumvention device.  That 
general requirement does not by itself pose the risk of the more elaborate and 
restrictive provisions of the DMCA.  Banning the trafficking of anti-circumvention 
devices does not, without more, enable anticompetitive lockouts as long as it leaves 
room, for example, for Jordan to create exceptions to the anti-circumvention 
prohibition to recognize the anticompetitive danger.  But could it not be argued that 
the general treaty requirement to ban anti-circumvention devices does not tolerate 
any exception?  Not likely.  Like all the other FTAs on this point, this anti-
circumvention obligation applies to both Jordan and the United States.  The United 
States, of course, has exceptions to the anti-circumvention rule, and there was no 
                                                                
36See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, http://www.wipo. 
int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/94dc.pdf [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, http://www.wipo.int/documents/ 
en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/95dc.pdf [hereinafter WPPT]. 
37WCT, supra note 36, art. 11. 
38Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERK. TECH. L. J. 519, 520 (1999) (noting 
that the DMCA “went far beyond treaty requirements”). 
39World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database Notifications, at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&search_what=N&treaty_id=16 
(showing accessions by Singapore, Bahrain, and the Dominican Republic in 2005). 
40Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/Section_Index.html. 
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public suggestion that it was prepared to remove those exceptions during 
negotiations. 
Chile.  The U.S.-Chile FTA requires each party to prohibit, both civilly and 
criminally, any person who knowingly circumvents an access control or who traffics 
in a device that circumvents an access or copy control.41  The knowledge requirement 
for circumventing an access control is new; it does not exist in the DMCA itself.42  
But the permissible enumerated exceptions generally track the DMCA.  They are, 
with parenthetical citations to the analogous provision in the DMCA:  
1. exceptions created to protect for three-year renewable periods non-
infringing uses of particular classes of works or users determined 
pursuant to an administrative or legislative proceeding (DMCA 
§1201(c));  
2. reverse engineering for interoperability (DMCA §1201(f));  
3. encryption research (DMCA §1201(g));  
4. protecting minors from inappropriate content (DMCA §1201(h)); 
5. testing security (DMCA §1201(j)); 
6. combating spyware (DMCA §1201(i));  
7. law enforcement (DMCA §1201(e)); and 
8. acquisition decisions by libraries and educational institutions (DMCA 
§1201(d)). 
Like the other subsequent FTAs, the U.S.-Chile FTA makes the renewable non-
infringing classes rule-making process applicable to both access and copy controls, 
even though the DMCA only permits it for access controls.  Also unlike the DMCA, 
the U.S.-Chile FTA permits a country to limit criminal liability when the defendant 
acted for a scientific or educational purpose.  The need for such a provision 
startlingly demonstrates that the technological transfer and knowledge promotion 
promised by promoters of a robust intellectual property regime might be undermined 
by the very law exported by the United States. 
Singapore.  The U.S.-Singapore FTA limits exceptions to the eight described 
above in the U.S.-Chile FTA, with the minor variation that the renewable period for 
exceptions pursuant to a rule-making proceeding can be up to four years.43  Unlike 
the DMCA, it limits liability for circumventing access controls to those who act 
knowingly or with reason to know.  The agreement with Singapore will likely be 
used as the model for negotiations with the other East Asian tiger economies.   
Australia.  With the 14th largest economy in the world,44 Australia represents a 
formidable negotiating partner, though it too agreed to the anti-circumvention 
provisions in its FTA with the United States.  Its provisions track those of the 
Singapore agreement, with the exception that they seem to permit the rule-making 
                                                                
41United States – Chile Free Trade Agreement art. 17.7, U.S.-Chile, July 16, 2003, State 
Dep. No. 04-35, 2003 WL 23856180, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html.  Criminal liability in the case of the 
trafficking may be restricted to “willful” conduct for “prohibited commercial purposes.”  Id. 
4217 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
43United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, http://www. 
ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
44WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 22 (2005). 
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exceptions to last longer than four years, even without renewal, as long as there is a 
rule-making proceeding to reconsider them every four years.  It is unclear whether 
this distinction will be of any practical significance.   
Morocco.  The U.S.-Morocco FTA drops the knowledge requirement for liability 
for circumventing an access control, thus bringing the agreement closer to the 
DMCA requirements.45  Otherwise, the U.S.-Morocco FTA closely resembles its 
U.S.-Australia predecessor, except for the rule-making proceeding exception, which 
follows the U.S.-Chile FTA in adopting the DMCA procedure (but does not make 
clear that the period is renewable upon additional showing). 
Bahrain.  The anti-circumvention provisions in the U.S.-Bahrain FTA are almost 
identical to those in the U.S.-Morocco FTA, except for the rule-making proceeding 
exception, which follows the U.S.-Chile FTA in adopting the DMCA procedure.   
CAFTA (in effect for certain countries).46  CAFTA bears great similarity to the 
U.S.-Bahrain agreement, with the exception that it permits review for additional 
exemptions to take place every four years.  
Oman (signed but not yet ratified).  The anti-circumvention provisions in the 
draft U.S.-Oman FTA47 are almost identical to those in the U.S.-Morocco FTA (but 
it does make clear that the period is renewable upon additional showing). 
Peru (signed but not yet ratified). The draft agreement with Peru is intended to 
serve as the model for the FTA with the Andean countries of Peru, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia.  The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement48 tracks closely 
the U.S.-Morocco FTA, except that it follows the rule-making procedure described 
above for the U.S-Australia FTA. 
FTAA (draft).  The draft agreement creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
also mandates anti-circumvention, but does not limit exceptions to the anti-
circumvention rule.49  Indeed, the latest draft of this agreement recognizes each 
member state’s right to define its own limitations: “In accordance with the preceding 
paragraph, technological measures shall not affect the exercise of the exceptions or 
limitations established in national legislation.”  The move to explicitly countenance 
national exceptions without limit runs exactly counter to demands from intellectual 
                                                                
45United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 
544, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/ 
Section_Index.html. 
46Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cen. 
Am.-Dom. Rep., Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html. 
47Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Oman, 
Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/ 
Final_Text/Section_Index.html. 
48United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Dec. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Draft_Texts/Section_Index.html. 
49Free Trade Area of the Americas (Third Draft), Ch. XX, art. 22, available  at http:// 
www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/ChapterXX_e.asp.  
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property interests to delimit the exceptions carefully, interests which point to the 
U.S.-Chile FTA as a model for such delimitation.50  
C. Summary: The Risks of Exporting Narrow Anti-Circumvention 
Figure 1.  Anti-Circumvention Mandates  
in United States Free Trade Agreements 
Trading Partner Anti-Circumvention 
Mandate 
Exceptions 
Israel (1985)51 No n.a. 
Canada (1989) No n.a. 
Mexico (1994) No n.a. 
Jordan (2001) Yes Broad 
Chile (2004) Yes Limited 
Singapore (2004) Yes Limited 
Australia (2005) Yes Limited 
Morocco (2006) Yes Limited 
Bahrain (2006) Yes Limited 
CAFTA (200652) Yes Limited 
Oman(not ratified) Yes Limited 
Peru (not ratified) Yes Limited 
FTAA (draft) Yes Broad 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the anti-circumvention provisions in the U.S. FTAs.   
Contrast the intellectual property provisions FTA recently concluded between 
Australia and Thailand.  That FTA seeks merely to prevent export of pirated and 
counterfeit goods and to cooperate to prevent such exports.53  Australia did not seek 
extensive additional rights for intellectual property holders.  We should ask whether 
when we seek to enlarge intellectual property rights abroad we are simply involved 
in rent-seeking.   
                                                                
50International Intellectual Property Alliance, Position Paper (Aug. 29, 2003) (proposing 
that “any exceptions to liability must be carefully narrowly crafted to preserve the adequacy 
and effectiveness of the anti-circumvention prohibitions (see Article 17.11.25 in the U.S.-
Chile Free Trade Agreement on limitations on liability for internet service providers)”), 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/miami/ABF/papers/piipa_e.asp.  This Alliance 
represents “a coalition of six U.S. trade associations that collectively represent the U.S. 
copyright-based industries.”  Id. 
51United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Aug. 19, 1985, available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/commerce_html/TCC_Documents/IsraelFreeTrade.html. 
52CAFTA is in effect between the United States, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
but not as of this writing, with respect to the Dominican Republic and Guatemala.  Costa Rica 
has not yet ratified the agreement.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
53Government of Australia, Guide to the Provisions of the Australia- Thailand Free Trade 
Agreement, Chapter 13:  Intellectual Property, art. 1302-05, (undated), available at http:// 
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/aust-thai/aust-thai_fta_guide.pdf.  
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III.  CONCLUSION 
In its understandable zeal to deter widespread copying of digital films and music, 
the U.S. government has aggressively required the promulgation of extremely strict 
anti-circumvention provisions as one cost of entry into a free trade agreement.  In the 
process, it has ignored the legal milieu of intellectual property, in particular, 
competition law, foisting upon our trading partners rules that may be exploited to 
permit corporations to gain monopolies in the after-market for their products. 
This is only the beginning of the exercise.  There is much more to review.  Free 
trade agreements include a host of intellectual property provisions that go beyond 
TRIPs, including mandates on topics such as database protections, domain names, 
encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, rights management information, and 
geographical indications.  In effect, we are rewriting the intellectual property laws of 
our trade partners.  If we are to engage in such a task, we must be mindful to avoid a 
narrow focus on protecting intellectual products.  Remembering Radin’s advice, we 
must not neglect the legal milieu of intellectual property as we export that law.  
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